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Copyright Infringement: An Argument for
the Elimination of the Scenes a Faire
Doctrine
By DON M. TAMURA*
I have heard many people say, "Give me the ideas, it does not
matter what words you put them into." These people knew
enough of artifice, but nothing of art. Ideas cannot be given but
in their minutely appropriate words.
-William Blake1
I
Introduction
The poet William Blake accurately summarized the central
conundrum of copyright law: distinguishing an idea from an
expression of that idea. Although copyright protection for orig-
inal writings has been a facet of American law since the found-
ing of the nation,2 courts and lawyers are still attempting to
determine the boundaries of copyright protection, with little
success.3 The advent of new forms of expression, primarily in
film and radio, has expanded the original scope of Anglo-Amer-
ican copyright law and exacerbated the disparity in reasoning
of jurists and scholars.4 Many theories and models have been
proposed to cope with the resultant vagaries of copyright law,
* Member, Third Year Class; B.S., University of California, Los Angeles, 1980. A
version of this note has been entered in the Nathan Burken Memorial competition.
1. H. BATTEN, M. GOODRICH & G. TOOGOOD, THE WRIrEN WORD 64 (1932).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
3. M. NIhMER, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A] (1981); N. BOoRSTYN, Copy-
RIGHT LAw § 10:14 (1981). For an exhaustive review of the history of early copyright law
in England and America, see L. PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
(1968), and for a concise summary, see Note, Derivative Works and the Protection of
Ideas, 14 GA. L. REV. 794 (1980).
4. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5659, 5664. See also Berman & Boxer, Copyright Infringement of Audiovisual
Works and Characters, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 315 (1979). For an example of disparate rea-
soning in the courts, compare Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365 (5th
Cir. 1981) with Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 984 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
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but no one proposal has dominated the lively exchanges con-
cerning copyright protection.
In an effort to bring clarity to the evanescent area of copy-
right infringement, a judge of the federal court for the southern
district of California proposed a theory of copyright protec-
tion-the scones d faire doctrine. The fanciful nature of the
doctrine's name belies the relative simplicity of the doctrine
itself.6 The scones ei faire doctrine was designed to protect
scenes, events or "stock" situations which are indispensable in
the treatment of a particular topic7 and essentially restates a
basic tenet of copyright law: expressions, not ideas, are pro-
tected by copyright.8
Over the last decade, the scones d faire doctrine has been
altered by courts from a mere proposal to a full-blown defense
for alleged copyright infringersY Its recent popularity, 10 how-
ever, has far outstripped its utility. Although the scones efaire
doctrine represents a laudable attempt at defining the breadth
of copyright protection, it is inherently vague and cannot be
reconciled with accepted models of copyright protection."
Notwithstanding this fact, several courts have relied on the
doctrine to bolster judicial findings, and in so relying courts
have sometimes contravened the original purpose of copyright
protection for artistic expressions. No court has relied solely
on the scones d faire doctrine to support its reasoning 2 but
more courts are using the scones dzfaire doctrine as the basis
for protecting infringing works. A combination of judicial leg-
erdemain and inadequate definitions has transformed the doc-
trine into a shield for potential infringers.
5. Schwarz v. Universal Pictures Co., 85 F. Supp. 270 (S.D. Cal. 1945). See infra
notes 83-92 and accompanying text.
6. Yankwich, Originality in the Law of Intellectual Property, 11 F.R.D. 457 (1951).
7. Id. at 462-463.
8. 17 U.S.C. app. § 102 (1976); Chatterton v. Cave, 3 App. Cas. 438, 501 (1878).
9. Warner Bros., Inc. v. ABC, Inc., 654 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1981); Hoehling v. Univer-
sal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980); Reyher v. Children's Television Work-
shop, 533 F.2d 87 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980, 97 S. Ct. 492 (1976); Jason v. Fonda,
1981 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 25,321 (Sept. 18, 1981); Midwood v. Paramount Picture
Corp., 1981 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 25,292 (Aug. 19, 1981); Twentieth Century-Fox
Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 200 (C.D. Cal. 1980), aff'd mem., No. 78-2437
(9th Cir. May 8,1981); Gibson v. CBS, Inc., 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1980);
Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40, 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
10. With the exception of Schwarz v. Universal Pictures Co., all cases mentioning
the sc~nes dfaire doctrine have issued opinions in the last five years, see supra note 9.
11. See infra section IV.
12. See supra cases at note 9.
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This note will show that the scenes dfaire doctrine is unnec-
essary because it lacks uniformity, continuity and is incompat-
ible with other models of copyright protection. The first
section will outline the legal requirements for an action in
copyright infringement and introduce two major theories of
copyright protection-the abstractions test and the patterns
test. In addition, this section contains a discussion of a semi-
nal Ninth Circuit decision 3 on procedure in copyright infringe-
ment actions. The next section describes the origins of the
scenes dfaire doctrine and its current application. Finally, the
note compares the doctrine to more established theories of
copyright protection to illuminate the doctrine's flaws and the
conflicts between it and other models.
II
Background to Copyright Infringement
Copyright law is designed to encourage the creation and dis-
tribution of an author's original work 14 To achieve this goal,
the owner of a copyright has the privilege of reproducing and
performing the copyrighted work and may grant that privilege
to others. 5 A major policy undergirding copyright law is based
on a belief that if protection were absent, then unauthorized
reproduction would impair the economic interest of the author
and curtail creation of new works. 6 A copyright gives the own-
er control over the "right to copy" his or her work.17
13. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th
Cir. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Krofft v. McDonald's].
14. Preface to D. JOHNSTON, COPYRIGHT HANDBOOK at xii (1978).
15. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 5.01[A]; N. BooasTYN, supra note 3, at § 1:1.
16. N. BOORSTYN, supra note 3, at § 1:2; D. JOHNSTON, supra note 14, at xii.
17. The history of copyright law began with the "right to copy." There would be no
copyright law if not for the printing press. Originally, copyright law focused on who
had the right to copy, not what was being copied. The right usually belonged to the
publisher. Early English cases dealt with literal reprinting and not the copying of
ideas. The earliest English case, Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K-B. 1769), involved
the rights of a publisher to print a book by James Thomson, The Seasons.
The focus of copyright law changed, however, when the rights to copy became vested
in the author of the work. The first American copyright case dealt with by the
Supreme Court was Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834). In Wheaton the issue was
the copying of official reports of the Supreme Court. The court intimated that copying
could still be performed by a condensation of the casenotes, but this consideration was
only dictum.
It wasn't until several federal cases were decided that the concept of non-identical
copying became nascent. Judge Story, the author of many early copyright opinions,
wrote:
No. 1]
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Copyright protection safeguards imaginative compositions
without allowing the owner of the copyright hegemony over
ideas embodied in the protected work.'8 According to modern
copyright law, ideas are in the public domain. That is, no one
can own a copyright of an idea.19 The rationale behind this pol-
icy is that by allowing a person to control the dissemination of
ideas, creation of new and original writings and artistic prod-
ucts would be stifled.20 Therefore, copyright law protects only
expressions of ideas because it is thought that, while there are
few ideas, there are many expressions of the same idea.2 '
A. Elements of an Action for Copyright Infringement
In any action for copyright infringement, the plaintiff, the
person claiming his or her work has been infringed, must prove
two elements: ownership by the plaintiff and copying by the
defendant.22 There are always two works central to every in-
fringement case-a prior work, claimed by the plaintiff, and a
second work, claimed by the defendant. The plaintiff must
show by a preponderance of evidence that the second work in-
fringed the prior work.23
Ownership may be proven by evidence of original creation of
the prior work or by possession of the copyright through sale
or transfer.24 Registration of the work with the Register of
Copyrights is prima facie evidence of the validity of the copy-
right,25 but is not necessary to prove ownership by original cre-
In many cases, the question may naturally turn upon the point, not so much
of quantity, as of the value of the selected materials. As was significantly said
on other occasions--"Non numerantur, ponderantur." The quintessence of a
work may be piratically extracted, so as to leave a mere caput mortuum, by
selection of all the important passages in a comparatively moderate space.
Gray v. Russell, 10 F. Cas. 1035, 1038 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 5,728). A whole line of
cases following the same reasoning appeared, several written by Judge Story. See Fol-
som v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901); Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas.
615 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436); Daly v. Palmer, 6 F. Cas. 1132 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868)
(No. 3,552).
A more extensive review of the development of American copyright law is contained
in B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT (1967).
18. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 2.03[D].
19. 17 U.S.C. app. § 102(b) (1976).
20. N. BOORSTYN, supra note 3, at § 1:2.
21. 1 M. NvMhER, supra note 3, at § 2.03[D].
22. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 13.01; N. BOORSTYN, supra note 3, at § 10:10.
23. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 3, at §§ 12.11[A], 12.11[D].
24. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 13.01 [A]; N. BOORSTYN, supra note 3, at § 10:11.
25. 17 U.S.C. app. § 410(c) (1976).
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ation.26 A copyright may also be transferred from the original
creator to another party, giving rise to ownership by third
parties.2
7
Usually, there is little evidence to prove the actual copying of
the prior work by the defendant.28 Few, if any, witnesses to the
act of copying can be found; therefore, the courts have devised
a method for inferring copying. The plaintiff must prove two
sub-elements to create this inference: access to the prior work
and substantial similarity29 between the two works.
Access is a threshold requirement necessary to invoke the
inference of copying. Courts have assumed that copying can-
not occur unless the defendant had an opportunity to view or
read the prior work. 0 Once the sub-element of access has
been proven, the plaintiff must fulfill the second requirement.3
Substantial similarity, the second sub-element, must exist
between the two works before the inference of copying will
arise.3 2 The rationale for this requirement is a belief that copy-
ing of the prior work must not be trivial nor insubstantial.3 3 It
is here that the majority of problems occur, and the history of
copyright law is replete with attempts to define and limit the
concept of substantiality. These attempts often take the form
of models or tests which may be applied by the court in arriv-
ing at a decision on infringement.
B. The Abstractions Test
The main issue confronting most courts is the breadth of pro-
tection afforded the plaintiff's work.' In a copyright infringe-
ment action, a court must distinguish an idea from an
expression because the general rule is that the second work
may use the ideas of the prior work, but not the prior work's
expressions.3 The courts' "line-drawing" between the dispa-
26. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 129, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5659, 5745; 17 U.S.C. app. § 301 (1976). See also 3 M. NUMMER, supra note 3, at
§ 13.01[BI.
27. 1 M. NimmER, supra note 3, at §§ 5.01[A]-5.01[B].
28. Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970).
29. 3 M. NUIMER, supra note 3, at § 13.01 [B]; N. BOORSTYN, supra note 3, at § 10:12.
30. 3 M. NIMER, supra note 3, at § 13.02; N. BOORSTYN, supra note 3, at § 10:13.
31. Id.
32. 3 M. NnmMER, supra note 3, at § 13.03; N. BOORSTYN, supra note 3, at § 10:14.
33. Shipman v. R.-O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 100 F.2d 533, 537 (2d Cir. 1938).
34. Krofft v. McDonald's, 562 F.2d at 1163.
35. 17 U.S.C. app. § 102(b) (1976) (excludes "idea" from copyright protection);
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
No. 11
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rate concepts of idea and expression, however, is inherently
vague and arbitrary. There is some suggestion that all such
determinations are invariably ad hoc36 and that judicial line-
drawing is of limited utility. 7 To counter this suggestion, schol-
ars and writers have devised numerous models to aid judges
and juries in determining the interface between an idea and an
expression.38
Judge Learned Hand proposed one of the first models in
1930. 39 Now called the "abstractions" test by modern courts,
his theory, or model, presumed the existence of a continuum
between ideas and expressions.' As Judge Hand envisioned
it, the continuum was linear, with an idea pole and an expres-
sion pole diametrically opposed. The idea end of the contin-
uum was general and non-descriptive, whereas the expression
end was fraught with distinctive embellishment and creative
ornamentation.4 1 Hence, as one progressed from the idea pole
to the expression pole, one encountered increasing complexity
and intricacy.
If the abstractions test is applied to a copyrighted work, for
example, a novel might be equated with a story outline, a sy-
nopsis or even a sentence. Each of these forms has succes-
sive degrees of complexity, ranging from very simple to very
complex. Between these disparate categories of simplicity and
complexity lies a point at which one of the forms is too broad,
too general or too vague and is therefore unprotectable.4 3
Under Hand's test, as an expression becomes more "abstract,"
it loses the distinctiveness which makes it protectable.
The abstractions test has been criticized as merely restating
the rule of expression protectability.44 The test, say some crit-
ics, is not a test at all because it provides no guidance in sepa-
36. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (1960).
37. Sorensen & Sorensen, Re-Examining the Traditional Legal Test of Literary
Similarity: A Proposal for Content Analysis, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 638 (1952).
38. See infra notes 39-60 and accompanying text.
39. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (citing
Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 86).
40. An illustration of the idea/expression continuum is contained in Knowles &
Palmieri, Dissecting Krofft: An Expression of New Ideas in Copyright?, 8 SAN FERN.
V.L. REV. 109, 127 (1980).
41. London v. Biograph Co., 231 F. 696, 698 (1916); see also Note, supra note 3, at 801
n.38.
42. 45 F.2d at 121.
43. 100 F.2d at 538 (Hand, J., concurring).
44. Knowles & Palmieri, supra note 40, at 119.
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rating ideas from expressions.45 In reality, note Hand's
detractors, every court considers an idea an abstraction of an
expression." Therefore, the abstractions test does nothing
more than provide a model of the idea/expression continuum
and does not outline a methodology for determining the bound-
ary of protectable expression.
C. The Patterns Test
To that end, fifteen years after the abstractions test was pro-
posed, Professor Zecheriah Chafee, Jr. wrote a monograph on
the law of copyright within which he observed that infringe-
ment occurs when a prior work's essential "pattern" or se-
quence of events is similarly recounted by a second author.
He defined a pattern as a series of abstractions arranged tem-
porally or chronologically.48 Professor Melville Nimmer once
compared the abstractions of Romeo and Juliet to the abstrac-
tions of West Side Story by chronologically selecting similar
events from both works.4 9 He concluded that the two works
were substantially similar under the patterns test due to thir-
teen coincident elements in both stories.5" It is essential to
note that each element is not necessarily dependent on an-
other element insofar as chronological arrangement is
concerned.
A second definition of a pattern is as a fixed arrangement of
events or occurrences. 51 A common, banal pattern, for exam-
ple, might be: boy meets girl, boy marries girl, boy and girl
have a family, etc. The difference between this approach and
the preceding approach is that in the former, chronology is a
by-product, whereas in the latter, each event is interdependent
on other events. Under either construction, infringement oc-
curs when the pattern in the prior work identically corre-
sponds to the pattern in the second work. 2
45. Note, "Expression" and "Originality" in Copyright Law, 11 WASHBURN L.J. 400,
406 (1972); see also Knowles & Palmieri, supra note 40.
46. See supra note 45.
47. Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright I, 45 CoLum. L REv. 503, 513 (1945).
48. Id. at 514.
49. 3 M. NIMmER, supra note 3, at § 13.03[A]. Cf. Knowles & Palmieri, supra note
40, at 149 (the authors reach the opposite conclusion using the patterns test).
50. 3 M. NU04ER, supra note 3, at § 13.03[A] [1].
51. E.g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 55-56 (2d Cir. 1936).
52. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 13.03[A]; Note, Copyright: Hollywood v.
Substantial Similarity, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 177 (1979).
No. 1]
COMM/ENT L. J.
The patterns test has been acknowledged in numerous arti-
cles and treatises since its creation.53 As commentators have
perceived it, the foundation for the patterns test rests on a be-
lief that the pattern of a work is integral to its expression. It is
thought that an author fashions a unique arrangement of ideas
from among myriad permutations and that therefore he or she
is entitled to copyright protection.'M A corollary to this belief is
the idea that if the patterns of two works are substantially sim-
ilar, then copying must have occurred.
The patterns test, however, is not without its detractors. One
criticism of the patterns test is that it is a glorified version of
the abstractions test.56 A pattern might be considered a com-
plex abstraction, much like a detailed outline, which approxi-
mates the line between idea and expression better than a
simple abstraction." Another criticism is that the patterns test
provides no more guidance than the abstractions test.58 Critics
note that neither te~t establishes standards for differentiating
an expression from an idea, leaving juries and judges few solu-
tions in resolving this key issue.5 9
In support of the abstractions and the patterns tests, propo-
nents have argued that the tests aid laymen in recognizing the
distinctions between ideas and expressions and that more re-
strictive models will lack enough flexibility to accomodate the
variety of artistic and literary works.60 To some extent these
supporting arguments are valid. Juries and judges often rely
on theoretical models when deciding complex and intricate is-
sues.61 At least, both the patterns test and the abstractions
test formalize the idea/expression distinction. At most, the
53. See 3 M. NIMMER, mupra note 3, at § 13.03[A]; Berman & Boxer, supra note 4, at
318; Knowles & Palmieri, supra note 40, at 136; Note, supra note 51, at 187.
54. Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690, 691 (2d Cir. 1926).
55. See Nimmer, Inroads on Copyright Protection, 4 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP)
(1952).
56. See Knowles & Palmieri, supra note 40, at 136; Sorensen & Sorensen, supra
note 37.
57. See Note, supra note 51, at 189.
58. See Sorensen Sorensen, supra note 37, at 642.
59. Despite these criticisms, the patterns test has been used recently in Reyher v.
Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1976), and Musto v. Meyer, 434
F. Supp. 32, 35-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). The abstractions test can be found in Herbert Rosen-
thal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971), and Burnett v. Lambino,
204 F. Supp. 327, 332-334 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
60. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 13.03[A] [1].
61. E.g., the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur might be considered an aid for judges and
juries, W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 211-235 (4th ed. 1971).
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tests provide a method of comparing two works in a relatively
uncomplicated manner so that juries and judges can deal with
the complex issue of copyright infringement. So far, courts
have been unwilling to interpret strictly the concepts of idea
and expression, fearing that future forms of expression could
be denied protection.
D. The Kroffl Process
The Ninth Circuit has chosen a different approach to avoid
the Procrustean bed between vague standards and restrictive
construction. In Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions,
Inc. v. McDonald's Corp. ,62 the court set forth a two-fold pro-
cess to determine substantial similarity. 3 It is important to
recognize that the Krofft process does not supersede the ab-
stractions and patterns tests. Rather, it is a procedural device
designed to aid courts in resolving the issue of substantial sim-
ilarity. The abstractions test and the patterns test are still in-
valuable tools in measuring the extent of copyright protection.
Krofft merely specifies the timing of their application. The
goal of the Krofft court was to promulgate a more objective and
accurate procedure in hopes of eradicating confusion about
copyright protection.'
The methodology of Krofft is best described as a process
toward finding substantial similarity. The first step, called the
extrinsic test, is a determination of the similarity of ideas be-
tween the two works.65 Krofft assumes that there can be no
similarity of expression without some similarity of idea.
Therefore, the extrinsic test is a threshold issue which de-
mands a significant showing of similarity of idea. This step is
intended to be a finding made by a judge, and dissection, or
expert testimony on the differences and similarities in both
works, is appropriate at this stage.
62. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
63. The process is essentially a "reduction to practice" outlined in an earlier case,
Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 851, 67 S. Ct.
1096 (1947). See also 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 13.03[E] [3]; N. BOORSTYN, supra
note 3, at § 10:14.
64. Knowles & Palmieri, supra note 40, at 131-133; Note, Copyright Infringement
Actions: The Proper Role for Audience Reactions in Determining Substantial Similar-
ity, 54 S. CAL L REV. 385, 410 (1981); Note, supra note 51, at 183.
65. 562 F.2d at 1162. See also Knowles & Palmieri, supra note 40, at 132.
66. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 13.03[E] [3]; Knowles & Palmieri, supra note 40,
at 132; Note, supra note 51, at 184.
67. 562 F.2d at 1164.
No. 11
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Once the court is convinced the extrinsic test has been satis-
fied, the issue of substantial similarity procedes to the resolu-
tion of the similarity of expression, called the intrinsic test.68
This second step encompasses a finding made by the trier of
fact, usually a jury, and uses the "ordinary lay observer" stan-
dard. 9 Under the ordinary lay observer standard, the trier of
fact must find that the average viewer or.reader believes the
two works to be substantially similar in expression.70 Only a
similarity sufficient to infer copying, not actual confusion of or-
igin,7 1 need be found. The Krofft opinion indicated that dissec-
tion is inappropriate at this stage because it is unnecessary
under the ordinary lay observer standard.72
Although the reasoning of Krofft has been followed in the
Ninth Circuit 73 and has been cited in other circuits,7 4 one
writer has criticized the process because it does not eradicate
the peculiarities and problems of the ordinary lay observer
standard, such as the relative unsophistication of juries con-
fronted with unfamiliar media.5 Other critics fear that there
will be fewer reversals at the appellate level because judges
frequently reach a finding of similarity of idea, thus satisfying
the extrinsic test.76 A jury usually renders the finding of simi-
larity of expression, creating a difficult obstacle to overcome at
the appellate level. Appellate courts are reluctant to tamper
with lower court findings unless there is a clear error on which
reasonable minds may not differ.7 7 Finally, much criticism fo-
68. Id.
69. Knowles & Palmieri, supra note 40, at 120. See generally Note, supra note 64.
70. See Note, supra note 64, at 389-391.
71. "Confusion of origin" is a trademark concept. It has had some utility, and mis-
use, in cases on the fringe of copyright law, e.g., International News Service v. Associ-
ated Press, 248 U.S. 215, (1918) (copyright protection unavailable for news stories).
72. 562 F.2d at 1164 (citing Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Stonesifer, 140
F.2d 579, 582 (9th Cir. 1944)).
73. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 200 (C.D.
Cal. 1980), arffd mem., No. 78-2437 (9th Cir. May 8, 1981); Walker v. University Books,
Inc., 602 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1979).
74. O'Neill v. Dell Publishing Co., 630 F.2d 685 (1st Cir. 1980); Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders v. Scoreboard Posters, 600 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1979); Franklin Mint Corp.
v. Nat'l Wildlife Art Exch., 595 F.2d 62 (3rd Cir. 1978); MGM, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta
Co-op. Prod., Inc., 479 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Geo. 1979); Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner Prod-
ucts, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
75. See Note, supra note 64.
76. 562 F.2d at 1164 (citing International Luggage Registry v. Avery Products Corp.,
541 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1976); Caddy-Imler Creations, Inc. v. Caddy, 299 F.2d 79 (9th Cir.
1962)). See also 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 13.03[E].
77. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, Civa PROCEDURE § 13.8 (2d ed. 1977).
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cuses on Krofft's elimination of dissection in the intrinsic
stage, which allows no expert testimony before the trier of
fact.78 It has been argued that juries cannot arrive at sound
conclusions without expert testimony, particularly in areas
such as music, where the average juror has only a modicum of
expertise.79 By sanitizing the evidence before the jury, deci-
sions might be rendered on "gut reaction" alone.
Krofft is a relatively recent decision and it is too early to tell
whether these problems will arise. No case using Krofft has
gone to a jury because judges carefully scrutinize evidence at
the extrinsic stage, especially on motions for summary judg-
ment.80 Hence, cases rarely proceed past the extrinsic step un-
less there is a good probability that a jury will find similarity of
expression. Courts which have adopted Krofft, or some similar
version, have indicated that a summary of similarities and dif-
ferences in both works may go to the trier of fact.81 This lim-
ited form of dissection is not obligatory, but at least may allow
a jury access to testimony by experts regarding other infringe-
ment theories.
The value of Krofft is unknown at this time and more cases
adhering to the rationale of Krofft must be decided before sub-
stantial weight can be given to the process. Courts which have
used the Krofft process, however, have been willing to assume
the validity of the procedure and have adapted the process in
deciding issues of substantial similarity.82
III
The Scines 4 Faire Doctrine
In 1945 Judge Leon Yankwich of the U.S. District Court in
California proposed another theory of copyright protection.
His opinion in Schwarz v. Universal Pictures Co.83 used the
French phrase "sctnes a faire" to describe non-copyrightable
78. Note, supra note 64, at 413. See also 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 13.03 E].
79. See Note, supra note 64.
80. See, e.g., Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
200 (C.D. Cal. 1980). See ibfra note 144.
81. E.g., Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner Products, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(the court said that a brief summary of the similarities and differences between both
works may be given to the trier of fact).
82. See supra note 74 for cases using the Krofft test.
83. 85 F. Supp. 270 (S.D. Cal. 1945). Judge Leon Yankwich was a competent
scholar on the law of copyright and wrote extensively on the concept of protectability
of expressions. See Yankwich, supra note 6.
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material in original works.84 Scnes dfaire, as Judge Yankwich
described them, are "scenes which 'must' be done,"8 5 or alter-
natively, scenes which are so integral to the plot or theme that
they arise as a natural consequence of an artist's expression.
Judge Yankwich explains the doctrine in this way:
These cases indicate that when you are dealing with a com-
mon idea, no matter how different the treatment may be, com-
mon elements will appear in both products. In so far as these
common elements are distinct, they amount to creative origi-
nality. And, in so considering them, the similarities which are
traceable to the common sources are disregarded. But similar-
ities may appear which are inherent in a situation. The French
refer to them as scenes dfaire .. .86
In a later monograph, Judge Yankwich reiterated the scenes
etfaire doctrine and his reasoning in Schwarz. After reviewing
the traditional methods courts have used to distinguish ideas
from expressions, he concluded that practical application
created finer distinctions than traditional methods.87 There
was not, as had been suggested earlier, a vast difference be-
tween idea and expression, for sometimes plot devices con-
tained characteristics of both. He noted that certain
situational requirements of a plot often demand that scenes be
similar. The scnes !faire doctrine, therefore, was intended to
protect an author whose work had similar elements of an ear-
lier work because specific scenes demanded those
similarities. 88
The facts of Schwarz are helpful in explaining the scnes 6
faire doctrine. In one of the works at issue there was a scene
in which a girl's hand is marked by a burn. The scene was nec-
essary for the purpose of identification. Once this situation
had been created, it was also necessary to create other scenes
explaining the burn. The second work had similar scenes ex-
plaining an identifying mark. 9 Judge Yankwich said that the
similar scenes were a natural and necessary consequence of
the earlier identification scene.90 Consequently, an author
84. 85 F. Supp. at 275.
85. Id. The literal translation is more accurately "scenes to be done."
86. Yankwich, supra note 6, at 462.
87. Id. at 461.
88. Id. at 462-463.
89. 85 F. Supp. at 275.
90. Id.
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could not infringe scenes which "had to be resorted to"'" by us-
ing them in his own work.
Sctnes d faire might be analogized to a row of dominoes,
each domino representing an idea or an abstraction. Once one
domino falls, the rest must necessarily fall as well. Therefore,
once an idea is used, other ideas must naturally fall into place
as a result. The sctnes d faire doctrine was intended to insu-
late an author who uses a set of ideas stemming from one idea.
Judge Yankwich devised the doctrine because he realized how
easy it was to mistake the use of sctnes dfaire, the set of domi-
noes, for plagiarism.92
The doctrine has never been used alone in justifying a find-
ing of non-infringement by a second author. In the past dec-
ade, however, the number of cases employing the scenes d
faire argument has increased significantly.9 3 Defendants use
the scbnes d faire doctrine as an additional weapon among a
panoply of defenses to an allegation of copyright infringe-
ment.94 Unfortunately, this trend has led to protection of po-
tentially infringing works.
A. Historical Works
A recent example of this disturbing trend is Alexander v.
Haley,95 in which the book Roots, by Alex Haley, was found
not to infringe an earlier work, the book Jubilee. Both books
contained identical references to historical folkways and
"stock" events.96 The district court referred to the sctnes d
faire doctrine in holding that the common incidents, charac-
ters and settings were indispensable to any treatment of the
topic of slavery.97 Citing earlier cases,98 the court reiterated
91. Yankwich, supra note 6, at 463.
92. Id. at 462-465.
93. See supra notes 9-10.
94. E.g., Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 200
(C.D. Cal. 1980).
95. 460 F. Supp. 40, 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
96. Id. at 45, 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 243.
97. Among the examples of scenes dfaire were: sex between male slaveowners
and female slaves and the consequent resentment of the female slave owners (Jubilee,
at 44, Roots, at 436); the sale of a slave child away from her family and the attendant
agonies (Jubilee, at 84-85, Roots, at 424-426); the horror of punitive mutilation (Jubilee,
at 114, Roots, at 224); and slave owners complaining about the high price of slaves (Ju-
bilee, at 113, Roots, at 397). Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. at 45 n.7, 200 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) at 243 n.7. An example of the similarities in both works is found in PUBLISHERS
WEEKLY, May 2, 1977, at 20.
98. Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1976); Fuld v.
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that the scdnes afaire in question were ideas, not expressions,
and therefore were unprotected by copyright.
Using the earlier domino analogy, the court in Alexander
might have reasoned that the idea of slavery was the first dom-
ino to topple, setting the other scines a faire into motion. In
this case, the scenes of interracial sex, mutilation and child ab-
duction were deemed necessary to the exposition of the slav-
ery theme.99 Therefore, reasoned the court, Alex Haley's use
of these scenes did not infringe similar scenes in Jubilee.
A factor which might have affected the Alexander court's de-
cision is the fact that the two works had some historical or fac-
tual basis. 100 In general, courts have granted protection to
historical works, but have not extended this protection to facts
or other non-fictional information contained in these works.
Fearing that the policy of encouraging contributions to the
public domain is stymied by such protection, courts have al-
lowed defendants to use descriptions and scenarios only tan-
gentially related to historical fact.1 1 Alexander affirms the
principle that even fictional works based on historical facts
cannot infringe the non-fictional part of a prior work.
10 2
B. Fictional Works
Fictional works can also fall under the rubric of scenes a
faire, if it can be shown that the scbnes afaire are distinct mo-
tifs or events associated with a specific genre. These genres or
types, such as the Western or horror story, are considered by
courts to be a part of the larger body of ideas. 0 3 Therefore,
fictional works may also contain sctnes a faire.
A current example is Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v.
MCA, Inc. ,' 04 a case dealing with the purported infringement of
National Broadcasting Co., 390 F. Supp. 877 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Greenbie v. Noble, 151 F.
Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Warshawsky v. Carter, 132 F. Supp. 758 (D.D.C. 1955).
99. 460 F. Supp. at 45, 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 243.
100. See Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981); Hoehling
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980); Rosemont Enter., Inc. v. Ran-
dom House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009, 87 S. Ct. 714
(1967).
101. 618 F.2d at 980.
102. Both the book Roots and the book The Hindenburg in Alexander v. Haley and
Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., respectively, were considered fictional ac-
counts based on real events.
103. E.g., 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 207-208.
104. 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 200 (C.D. Cal. 1980), affd mem., No. 78-2437 (9th Cir. May 8,
1981).
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the motion picture "Star Wars" by the television series "Bat-
tlestar Galactica."'1 5 The district court did not base its deci-
sion on the scenes d faire doctrine 10 6 but mentioned it and
granted summary judgment for the defendant. 10 7 In a counter-
claim alleging that "Star Wars" infringed a prior science fiction
film owned by the defendant, MCA, the circuit court usedthe
scenes afaire rationale to deny copyright protection for the ex-
pression of a small robot.108 In both opinions, no protection
was given to the elements of a science fiction drama because
they were, in the opinions of both courts, stock motifs of the
genre. 10 9 The courts reasoned that, in comparing the separate
elements individually, a subsequent work does not infringe a
prior work if only scenes dfaire have been appropriated.
C. Definitional Problems
The application of the scenes afaire doctrine to the facts of a
case presents several difficulties. The first is that although this
judge-made concept is a convenient sobriquet for the idea/ex-
pression distinction, it actually goes beyond mere protection of
potential infringers. The emphasis of prior theories has been
on the act of copying by the infringer. The focus has been on
the relationship between the two works, i.e., was the second
work a result of the first work. The scenes a faire doctrine
shifts this focus to include auxiliary factors such as the pub-
lic's concept of ideas and the ability of the reader or viewer to
notice alterations"n0
105. There was substantial evidence that the public considered the two works to be
similar. Two national weekly magazines did extensive stories prior to the premiere of
"Battlestar Galactica." Small-Screen Star Wars: Battlestar Galactica seems strangely
familiar, TIME, Sept. 18, 1978, at 98; TV Blasts Off., NEWSWEEK, Sept. 11, 1978, at 58.
Both magazines mentioned the suit brought by Twentieth Century-Fox.
106. 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 207. For more insight into the science fiction genre see J.
BAXTER, SCIENCE FICTION IN THE CINEMA (1970).
107. 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 201.
108. The memorandum opinion of the appellate court dealt only with the counter-
claim of MCA against Twentieth Century-Fox. This counterclaim alleged that the
"Star Wars" android infringed a similar robot in MCA's earlier film "Silent Running."
109. An article in TIME, May 30, 1977, compared scenes and motifs from "Star Wars"
with other films, such as "The Wizard of Oz" and 'TYhirty Seconds Over Tokyo." The
film critic Audie Bock had suggested that "Star Wars" was influenced by Akira
Kurosawa's '"The Hidden Fortress," A. Bock, Film Notes for the Japanese Film Festi-
val, Sherman Theatre, Sherman Oaks, California (Oct. 12, 1979).
110. This is particularly true when the second work is a parody or satire of the prior
work. In Warner Bros., Inc. v. ABC, Inc., 654 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1981), the district court
judge mentioned the scenes afaire doctrine, but concluded that '"he Greatest Ameri-
can Hero" was a parody of "Superman, The Movie" and therefore protected under the
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It is widely recognized that minute alterations of expressions
in a prior work will not be afforded protection.' By the very
definition of the scnes dfaire doctrine, when a second author
uses a scene dfaire, he is using an idea from a prior work. The
second author must alter the description slightly because he
cannot take the expression verbatim. This altered form may
seem like a new expression, but still be substantially similar.
The copier incurs no liability, however, because the idea is un-
derstood to be unprotectable." 2
The major problem with the scLnes dfaire doctrine, however,
arises from the lack of judicial standards and limitations on the
doctrine." 3 Being a relatively inchoate theory, the sctnes d
faire doctrine has been only cursorily defined and superficially
scrutinized." 4 Very little guidance has been provided by the
courts as to what constitutes a genre or theme worthy of pro-
tection. The courts, for example, have never indicated when
the science fiction genre came into being." 5 The genre's liter-
ary roots may be traced to Jules Verne or H.G. Wells, but might
even encompass the works of Melville." 6
As is the case with many copyright infringement cases, the
dividing line between idea and expression seems clear when
applied to the facts of the case, but becomes obfuscated when
applied to other fact situations." 7 It may be relatively easy to
conclude that a robot is a common "character" in a science
fiction film" 8 but similar conclusions are difficult to reach
when applied to sword fights, barroom shootouts and rebellion
fair use doctrine. This conclusion was drawn despite the use of similar costumes, inci-
dents and settings. Accord Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956).
111. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121, cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902, 51
S. Ct. 216 (1930); 18 C.J.S. Copyright and Literary Property § 94 (1939).
112. 618 F.2d at 979-980.
113. The problem is not confined to the judicial arena but is found in the area of film
criticism, as well. See A. SARRIS, THE AMERICAN CINEMA 30 (1968).
114. Since 1945, when Judge Yankwich applied the phrase "sctnes dfaire" to copy-
right infringement actions, there have been only eight cases which have mentioned the
doctrine by name. See supra note 9.
115. Judge Hill's comment in Twentieth Century-Fox that the space/fantasy genre
was too new to form a foundation for infringement is characteristic of the problem. 209
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 207. One fim critic has examined the genre concept and found that
it changes with the social patterns of the times. He contends that genres are rarely
fixed and unchanging. See S. KAMiNSKY, AMERICAN FILM GENRES (1977).
116. J. BAXTER, supra note 106, at 7-13, 208-209.
117. E.g., Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner Products, Inc. 443 F. Supp. 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
118. Brief of Appellee at 16-17, Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., 209
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 200 (C.D. Cal. 1980.) (quoting Arthur Knight, professor of cinema at the
University of Southern California and film critic).
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among the oppressed. 119 "Star Wars" contained all of these el-
ements, but the last three could easily be found in Westerns,
sword-and-sorcery epics or documentaries.
Many judges who have agreed with the sctnes a faire doc-
trine have also assumed that their view of genres or themes is
in concordance with the average lay observer's viewpoint.120
There have been some suggestions that this notion is incorrect
and that popular sentiment and opinion have been ignored.' 2'
By definition, a genre or motif comes into existence by public
recognition and acceptance of that genre or motif. 22 But no
court has indicated the origin of its sctnes dfaire, other than a
tacit assumption that the public recognizes the ideas shared by
the two works in question.12
3
Besides a lack of definitional guidance on the sctnes dfaire
doctrine, there are some policy considerations which are cir-
cumvented by the doctrine. 24 In the case of historical works,
for example, the efforts of authors in their compilation and re-
search is negated by the sctnes d faire doctrine.125  Unless
there is verbatim copying, the sctnes d faire doctrine allows
the products of research to be copied with impunity. There are
a few cases which suggest that individual effort in ferreting out
information on historical events should not be denied protec-
tion.126 But the gist of the opinions is that the research must
affect the expression, and the courts inevitably center on the
blatant nature of the copying to justify its findings. 27
119. An example of the lack of judicial clarity can be found in Alexander v. Haley.
Judge Frankel distinguished historical facts, customs and scenes 6 faire. Is there re-
ally a difference, as far as the idea/expression distinction is concerned, between manu-
mission (historical fact), cockfighting (custom) and punitive mutilation of slaves
(scenes &faire)? The court offerred few guidelines as to how to categorize scenes and
situations. 460 F. Supp. at 45 nn.5-7, 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 242-243 nn.5-7. The court in
Hoehling v. Universal City Studios recapitulated the same process, dividing the inci-
dents into three categories: themes, facts and scenes dfaire. 618 F.2d at 979-980.
120. 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 207.
121. Note, supra note 64, at 386.
122. "Genre. A recognizable type of film which depends on certain established con-
ventions." L. GLNNEri, UNDERSTANDING MovIES 457 (1976) (emphasis added).
123. See supra note 105.
124. Note, supra note 51, at 179.
125. E.g., Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980); Alex-
ander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40, 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
126. See Toksvig v. Bruce Publishing Co., 181 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1950); Leon v. Pacific
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937); H.C. Wainwright & Co. v. Wall
Street Transcript Corp., 418 F. Supp. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Huie v. National Broadcasting
Co., 184 F. Supp. 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
127. A prerequisite to a finding of infringement by copying an historical work is that
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Another damaging aspect of the scenes d faire doctrine is
that it shifts the burden of proof back to the plaintiff.128 If the
defendant raises the defense of sctnes efaire, then the plaintiff
must show that the infringed scenes are protected by copy-
right. Traditionally, once the plaintiff has shown access and
substantial similarity, the burden shifts to the defendant to
prove independent creation.129 With the senes efaire doctrine
as an affirmative defense, the burden of proof shifts back to the
plaintiff to show that his or her expressions were copied.13 ° As
a result, the plaintiff must overcome this additional obstacle by
providing more evidence indicating that his or her expressions
are separable from ideas.1 31 This evidence may come in the
form of more expert testimony or stronger extrinsic evidence
of copying. At any rate, the plaintiffs case is weakened if no
such evidence exists or is unavailable.
In conclusion, judges have not provided enough guidance on
the definition of the scdnes efaire doctrine and on how the doc-
trine should be applied.
IV
Conflicts with Other Models
Besides the definitional problems attendant to the sctnes d
faire doctrine, there are irreconcilable differences between the
doctrine and the abstractions and patterns tests. These differ-
ences add undue complexity to the area of copyright infringe-
ment and result in capricious decisions by the courts. The
abstractions test and the patterns test represent accepted
models of copyright protection and provide uniformity and gui-
dance to the courts. In addition, the Krofft process aids courts
by formalizing the method of examining the issue of infringe-
ment. Because the sctnes dfaire doctrine narrows the scope of
copyright protection, it creates inherent conflicts with the
other tests and models. As a result, the benefits gained by the
development of the traditional methods of copyright protection
the alleged copier must not have done any independent research to arrive at the same
facts. 184 F. Supp. at 200. Cf. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d at 979
(citing Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966)).
128. The burden of proof is always upon the plaintiff to prove access and copying.
See 3 M. NMMnER, supra note 3, at § 12.11[D]; N. BOORSTYN, supra note 3, at § 10:12.
129. See 3 M. NmMi.i, supra note 3, at § 12.11[D]. E.g., John L. Perry Studio, Inc. v.
Wernick, 597 F.2d 1308 (9th Cir. 1979).
130. 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 207.
131. See M. NnmmER, supra note 3, at § 12.11[D].
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are eliminated because the scones d faire doctrine cannot be
reconciled with these methods.
A. Conflicts with the Abstractions Test
At first glance, a layman might view the scenes a faire doc-
trine as an interpretation of the abstractions test, especially if
he equates a sctne dfaire with an unprotectable expression.132
Originally, scenes dfaire were defined as ideas. Recently, how-
ever, courts have misconstrued the intent of the doctrine and
have applied the doctrine to abstractions which might merit
protection.
A case in point is the court of appeals' discussion of robots in
Twentieth Century-Fox. The three robots at issue were small,
mobile androids which were capable of organic responses. 3 3 If
the court had applied the abstractions test, it would have ex-
amined each android separately and winnowed away the dis-
tinctive attributes and embellishments unique to each robot.
When the court had arrived at the most abstract, but still pro-
tectable, description, then it could have compared the two to
determine the issue of copying by the defendant. If the de-
scriptions were substantially similar, then there would be a
finding of infringement. Instead, the court used the scenes d
faire doctrine and reasoned that the idea of a robot was an
unprotectable scene a faire and that theefore any conception
or expression of that idea was similarly unprotectable. 134
This result stems from an error in logic on the part of the
court. The idea of a robot is free for use by anyone, but two
expressions of that idea may still infringe each other. The
court erred by reversing the argument, reasoning that if an
132. If, as the cases claim, scenes dfaire are ideas, then they might be considered
abstractions which are not sufficiently "concrete" to warrant protection. See Yank-
wich, supra note 6, at 462.
133. A copious dissection of the differences between the robots in "Star Wars" and
"Silent Running" is contained in Appellent's Opening Brief at 18-21, Twentieth Cen-
tury-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 200 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
134. The Ninth Circuit stated it plainly in its memorandum opinion. "The district
court found alternatively that there was no substantial similarity in idea or expression
between the Silent Running and Star Wars robots." Twentieth Century-Fox Film
Corp. v. MCA, Inc., No. 79-3342, mem. op at 3 (9th Cir. May 8, 1981) (emphasis added).
The footnote to the quote above can be found in note 135, infra. This clearly shows
that the appellate court considered the idea of a robot as equivalent to the expression
of a robot, so far as protection was concerned. The court reasoned that because the
"idea of a small robot in a science fiction setting" is unprotectable, then any expression
connected with that idea would also be unprotectable. The court failed to realize that
one can have a protectable expression originating with an idea.
No. 1]
COMM/ENT L. J.
idea is unprotectable, then any expression, other than a verba-
tim one, would also be unprotectable. 135 This misleading of the
sctne &faire doctrine is even more troublesome in light of the
facts of Twentieth Century-Fox. Testimony in the case indi-
cated that there have been various differing expressions of a
robot throughout the history of film.'36 MCA, in its reply brief,
listed several similarities particular to the robots in question,
but which were not particular to any other robot in earlier
films. 137
Clearly, there were several noticeable similarities between
MCA's and Twentieth Century-Fox's expression of a robot,13 8
but the scenes d faire doctrine effectively shielded Twentieth
Century-Fox's expression. Under the abstractions test, the
similarities would have been evident because the descriptions
would not have been "abstract" enough. The sctnes dz faire
doctrine, however, denied protection to the first expression, al-
lowing a second author to make substantial use of the distinc-
tive attributes of the first robot.
B. Conflicts with the Patterns Test
The sctnes !faire doctrine has a strong conflict with the pat-
terns test. In an earlier section, a pattern was described as
having two types: a chronological array of scenes or an inter-
dependent series of events. 139 The latter type of pattern
presents an untenable conflict with the sctnes Lfaire doctrine
because one protects expressions, whereas the other denies
protection.
In Alexander, for example, one event was the multilation of
a character as punishment for escaping14° This event may be
defined as a pattern which is interrelated to earlier events,
135. The Ninth Circuit noted: "To the extent that both the Universal and Fox char-
acters in question embody the idea of a small robot in a science fiction setting, they are
not protectable." Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., No. 79-3342, mem. op.
at 3 n.4 (9th Cir. May 8, 1981) (emphasis added). This conclusion was reached in spite
of the convincing argument proposed by MCA/Universal in its reply brief. See Appel-
lant's Reply Brief at 11-12, Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., 209
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 200 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
136. Brief of Appellee at 16-17, Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., 209
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 200 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
137. Appellant's Reply Brief at 11-12, Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA,
Inc., 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 200 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
138. Id.
139. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
140. 460 F. Supp. at 45-46.
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such as a scene depicting the capture and bondage of the char-
acter before multilation. The court, however, classified this
scene under the scenes dfaire doctrine, arguing that any treat-
ment of slavery might contain this stock treatment of brutality
towards slaves because it related to the larger theme of slav-
ery.14 1 If this scene had been considered a pattern, then it
would have been protected by the patterns test. Instead, the
court held that no infringement had occurred because the
scene was protected by the sctnes czfaire doctrine.
The key here is the interrelationship of the events in both
works. The patterns test was intended to protect these interre-
lated patterns and offer protection to the creator of the pattern.
On the other hand, it is clear that Judge Yankwich wanted to
put these interrelated patterns in the public domain."
Again using the domino analogy, a pattern of the second type
is like a row of dominoes. For the other scenes to fall into mo-
tion, there must be a initial event which sets them off. The pat-
terns test would protect this arrangement of "dominoes,"
whereas the scenes d faire doctrine would insulate the in-
fringer of the pattern.
C. Conflicts with the Kroffi Process
It seems evident that the sctnes dfaire doctrine is difficult to
reconcile with two major theories of copyright protection. But
even if the doctrine could be a reasonable theory standing
alone, it has several potential conflicts with the Krofft process.
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. is an illustrative example.
At the distict court level, in dealing with the first claim involv-
ing "Star Wars" and "Battlestar Galactica," the defendants
were granted summary judgment. 43 The district court judge
concluded that there was no similarity of idea between the two
works when viewed as a whole. Thus, the extrinsic test was
not satisfied.144 If the judge had applied the sctnes etfaire doc-
trine, the case would have had to proceed to the intrinsic test
stage. A finding by the judge that the defendant employed
scenes dfaire in his work would necessitate proceeding to the
next step because the judge would have found as a matter of
law that there was a similarity of ideas between the two
141. Id.
142. See Yankwich, supra note 6, at 461-465.
143. 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 201.
144. Id. at 205.
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works. 4 5 The definition of scones afaire implies that the sec-
ond work used the ideas of the prior work.'46
One of the criticisms of the Krofft process was that too many
cases would go to the jury. In reaction, many judges might
broaden their definition of "idea," as was done in Twentieth
Century-Fox, to prevent the case from proceeding to the in-
trinsic step. 147 The result is that controversies which might le-
gitimately pass to the triers of fact are disposed of at the
extrinsic step.
This supposition is borne out by the fact that no cases which
have mentioned the scones d faire doctrine have ever gone to
the jury, even in post-Krofft cases.'48 While juries have regu-
larly considered both the abstractions and the patterns tests,
no jury has ever confronted the scones d faire doctrine.149 A
major reason for this is the fact that many of the cases were
disposed of on summary judgment motions.5 Judges, how-
ever, have often used the doctrine to legitimatize their findings
that no infringement has occurred.
In short, when used in concert with the Krofft process, the
scones dfaire doctrine affords greater protection to infringers.
Hence, the doctrine is in conflict with accepted theories of
copyright law and raises the possibility of allowing infringers
to copy with impunity.' 5'
V
Conclusion
The scones &i faire doctrine was a novel attempt by Judge
Yankwich to clarify the extent of copyright protection. Unfor-
tunately, however, courts have used the doctrine to limit the
protection of authors from infringement. 5 2 Expressions of set-
145. Id. at 207.
146. The Ninth Circuit seems to have misinterpreted its own decision in Krofft. In
order to satisfy the extrinsic test, the court need only find a similarity of idea. Krofft
did not distinguish between a protectable idea and an unprotectable idea, as the Ninth
Circuit seems to imply in notes 134-135, supra. Ideas are never protectable.
147. See supra note 144.
148. All eight cases which mentioned the scones dfaire doctrine were dismissed on
a summary judgment motion or were refused injunctive relief. A jury has never heard
the scones dfaire doctrine discussed. See supra note 9 for a list of cases.
149. See supra notes 93-94 & 148 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 148.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 110-150.
152. See supra sections I and IV.
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tings and events, in both historical and fictional works, which
might normally have been protected under traditional theories,
are unprotected by the sctnes afaire doctrine.153 In addition,
the doctrine presents serious definitional problems because of
a lack of clear judicial guidance. 5 4 Finally, the sctnes dfaire
doctrine cannot be reconciled with other accepted models of
copyright protection and creates problems when applied to the
Krofft process. 55
The sctnes afaire doctrine adds unwarranted complexity to
an already complex area of law. Its recent fashionability raises
the spectre of misinterpretations by judges and attorneys unfa-
miliar with the doctrine's consequences. 56 Current methods
of dealing with copyright infringement, such as the abstrac-
tions and patterns tests, are adequate to cope with future tech-
nological changes and have a substantial backing in case
law.5 7 Therefore, the sctnes a faire doctrine should be elimi-
nated because it is an aberration in the law of copyright and
unnecessary to the resolution of the issue of substantial
similarity.
153. See supra notes 95-109 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 110-131 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 132-150 and accompanying text. See also Berman & Boxer,
supra note 4.
156. See supra notes 95-109 & 133-135.
157. See supra notes 34-60 and accompanying text.
[Editor's Note]:
During the time of publication several events occurred, the most significant of which
was the remand of Twentieth Century to the lower court by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., No. CA 80-5868, mem. op.
(9th Cir. Jan. 11, 1983). The court refused to speculate on the correctness of the district
court's reasoning, which discussed the scenes dfaire doctrine. Instead, the appellate
court focused on the inappropriateness of the dismissal by summary judgment motion.
The court stated: "We intimate no opinion whether the films are substantially similar
'is to either idea or expression, but state only that reasonable minds could differ on
those key factual issues. Thus, a grant of summary judgment was improvident." Id. at
3.
Another case examining the scenes 4faire doctrine is Atari, Inc. v. North American
Phillips Consumer Electronics Corp., 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1982). The case dealt with
infringement of a video game program. The court talked about the doctrine and said
that certain aspects of the video game could be considered scenes d faire. Notwith-
standing this pronouncement, the court found that the two programs were substan-
tially similar.
A recent law review article published in a journal of the Century City Bar Associa-
tion discussed the scenes dfaire doctrine and the Alexander and Twentieth Century
cases. Rosen, Current Trends in Entertainment Litigation-The Insurance Empire
Strikes Back, 1 ENTERTAINMENT L.J. 29 (1982).

